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SMIDDY V. VARNEY THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF
POLICE IMMUNITIES UNDER SECTION 1983
I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Congress enacted section one of the Civil
Rights Act of 187 1,' it created a federal damage remedy for individuals
who suffer violations of their constitutional rights at the hands of per-
sons acting under color of state law.' The statute remained relatively
dormant until 1960 when the United States Supreme Court, in Monroe
v. Pape, 3 held that a plaintiff whose constitutional rights had been vio-
lated by law enforcement officers4 acting under color of state law'
1. The Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), originally entitled the Klu Klux Act, was
intended by Congress as a method of enforcement of the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment through the power vested in it by section 5 of that amendment. Section one of
the Act became, with minor rephrasing, § 1979 of the Revised Statutes. R.S. § 1979, now
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1983] provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction therein to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
2. Note, Immunizing the Investigation Prosecutor Should The Dishonest Go Free or The
Honest Defendant?, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1110 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Immunizing the
Prosecutor] (discussion of prosecutorial immunity to section 1983 suits).
3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, the plaintiff sued 13 Chicago police officers who
broke into his home, searched it, and took him to the police station for 10 hours without a
search or arrest warrant and without lodging charges against him. The Supreme Court
framed the issue in Monroe narrowly: "[W]hether Congress, in enacting § 1979 [§ 1983]
meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of Constitutional rights, privileges and immuni-
ties by an official'r abuse of his position." Id at 172 (emphasis added). After thoroughly
analyzing the legislative history of § 1983, the Court held that in enacting § 1983, Congress
intended to rectify just the sort of wrong perpetrated in Monroe; i.e., to provide a remedy to
individuals deprived of constitutional rights by state or local law enforcement officers acting
under "color" of state authority. Id The Court further held that it was irrelevant whether
state law, custom or usage actually authorized the acts in question. Id at 184-87. The Court
also held that specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right was unnecessary to state a
claim under § 1983. Id at 187.
Although § 1983 was enacted over 100 years ago, it remained dormant for many years.
The Monroe decision breathed new life into the Act.
4. Throughout this Note, the terms law enforcement officers and police officers are used
interchangeably and refer to all state law enforcement personnel.
5. To recover in a civil action for deprivation of rights under § 1983, a plaintiff must
show that defendant acted "under color of state law," i.e. that defendant has deprived plain-
tiff of a right secured by the constitution or laws of the United States under color of statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory. Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d
1180 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds 424 U.S. 693, rehj' denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
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could bring a federal cause of action for damages under section 1983.
Since 1960, section 1983 has become an important vehicle by which
individuals, deprived of constitutional rights by police misconduct,
may seek redress by suing the individual officer for damages., This
recovery of damages serves two important functions: (1) to deter police
misconduct and (2) to compensate the victims of such misconduct.
7
In August, 1981, in Smiddy v. Varney 8 the Ninth Circuit held that
in section 1983 actions, absent malicious or reckless conduct on the part
of investigating officers, the "[fliling of a criminal complaint immunizes
... [the] officers ...from [liability for] damages suffered thereafter
. . "I For the plaintiff to succeed in an action for damages accruing
after the filing of a complaint, the court required rebuttal of a presump-
tion that the prosecutor, in filing the complaint, exercised independent
judgment in determining that there was probable cause for the arrest.' 0
This note will examine the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Smiddy
6. See WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as "WHITEBREAD"].
7. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, at 14. In this respect, § 1983 has been viewed as both a
corollary and an alternative to the exclusionary rule.
Purposes of two remedies are not the same. . . . [E]ach remedy has other pur-
poses which are not fulfilled by the other: the exclusionary rule cannot compen-
sate victims for the monetary loss; and a suit for damages does not enable the
judiciary to overcome the 'tainting effect' of convicting persons for crime on the
basis of evidence seized illegally, the very seizure of which is the basis for the
damage suit.
WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, at 14; see also, Newman, Suing the Law Breakers: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy For Law Enforcers Misconduct, 87 YALE L. J.
447 (1978). For the section 1983 damage suit to achieve its potential as an effective deterrent
and compensating remedy, it "must be substantially restructured to afford the injured victim
a better chance of success." Id. at 453. See also Nahmod, Section 1983 and The Background
of Liabili y, 50 INDIANA L. J. 15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Nahmod]; Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (see infra
note 80).
8. 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 65 (1982).
9. Id at 266 (emphasis added). The court also held: (1) the evidence supported the
finding that a polygraph examination administered by one defendant proximately caused
plaintiff's false arrest for murder, resulting in his damage; and (2) the jury instructions that a
defendant police officer who acts in good faith and with reasonable belief that his conduct is
constitutional could be found liable under the statute, put the issues to the jury fairly. The
court noted, however, that the instruction did not sharply define the "two-hurdle" require-
ment that the officers lack both probable cause for arrest and a reasonable good faith belief
that probable cause existed. d at 265-67.
10. Id at 266-67. The court noted that a plaintiff could rebut this presumption by: (1)
demonstrating that the investigating officers pressured or caused the district attorney to act
contrary to his/her independent judgment; (2) showing that the officers presented the district
attorney with information which they knew to be false, or (3) showing that the prosecutor
relied on the police investigation and arrest in filing the complaint, instead of making an
independent judgment on the existence of probable cause for the arrest. The court indicated
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vis-a-vis the traditional rationale for allowing immunities from liability
under section 1983. It is suggested that in creating this immunity the
Ninth Circuit radically departed from the policies underlying section
1983 and from a line of cases which had carefully carved out limited
immunities from section 1983 liability.1 Further, this note questions
whether, in establishing a rebuttable presumption that the prosecutor
exercises independent judgment, the Smiddy court properly analyzed
and relied on common law tort principles of proximate causation, and
whether the court's holding is supported by the decisions on which it
relies. Finally, this note discusses competing policy considerations un-
derlying the issues involved in Smiddy, and concludes that in Smiddy,
the Ninth Circuit ignored the language and spirit of section 1983 and
diminished the utility of that section as a deterrent to police
misconduct.
that these examples were not exclusive, and that "[plerhaps the presumption may be rebut-
ted in other ways." Id at 267.
Later in the opinion the court characterized this presumption as a disappearing pre-
sumption; i.e., the defendant has the burden of proof in asserting that an immunity attaches.
The plaintiff, however, has the burden of introducing evidence to rebut this presumption.
When the plaintiff has introduced such evidence, the burden remains on the defendant to
prove that an "independent intervening cause cuts off his tort liability." Id at 267 (citing
FED. R. EVID. 301).
In effect, the Ninth Circuit carved a type of hybrid or "quasi" immunity for law en-
forcement officials under § 1983. Prior to Smiddy, courts generally recognized two distinct
types of § 1983 immunity: (1) absolute immunity, whereby an individual, simply by virtue
of his title, is immune from liability for damages under the Act for all acts performed within
the scope of official duty, and (2) qualified immunity, whereby an official's liability depends
on the particular facts of the case; qualified immunity places the burden on the official to
defend the questionable actions. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); see also Immu-
nizing the Prosecutor, supra note 2, at 111. Compare Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951) (legislators enjoy absolute immunity when acting within scope of duty) with Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school officials enjoy qualified good faith immunity from
damages under § 1983).
The prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from § 1983 suits. See Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (prosecutor acting within the scope of prosecutorial duties enjoys
absolute immunity); see also Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1967); Bauers v.
Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967); Carmack v. Gibson,
363 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 1966); Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1975);
Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 1973); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492, 493
(10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 868 (1962); cf Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249,
1255-56 (Ist Cir. 1974) (under section 1983 police officers not immune from liability merely
because state statute provided for indemnification of officers by their public employers);
Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 515-16 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 975 (1976).
11. Courts create such limited immunities only in extremely narrow circumstances. See
infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS OF THE CASE
On November 15, 1973, defendants Varney and Nuckles, exper-
ienced homicide investigators, arrested Gary Smiddy for the murder of
Linda Miller.12 The day after Smiddy's arrest, defendant Inglin, presi-
dent of the California Association of Polygraph Examiners, gave
Smiddy a polygraph examination. The police had made a deal with
Smiddy's attorney, whereby they agreed to release Smiddy if he passed
the test.' 3 Inglin concluded that Smiddy had responded deceptively to
the exam questions. A committee of past presidents of the Association
evaluated Smiddy's polygraph examination, however, and concluded
that the test had been administered deficiently.'4
On November 19, 1973, four days after the arrest, the district attor-
ney for the County of Los Angeles filed a criminal complaint charging
Smiddy with the murder of Linda Miller. 15 On December 14, 1973, a
preliminary hearing was held in municipal court, and Smiddy was
bound over to superior court. Smiddy posted bail and was released the
following day, having spent approximately four weeks in jail.16 On
January 23, 1974, the superior court dismissed the complaint for insuf-
ficient evidence of probable cause.'
7
On October 15, 1976, Smiddy filed suit for damages under section
1983 in federal district court, alleging that his arrest and incarceration
violated his civil rights.'8 In a lengthy jury trial in 1978, Smiddy ar-
gued that Varney and Nuckles conducted their investigation negli-
12. 665 F.2d at 263; see also Brief for Appellant at 1, Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261
(9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Appellant's Briefl.
13. 665 F.2d at 264.
14. Id The committee conducted the evaluation at Inglin's request after Inglin had
received complaints that he had conducted the examination improperly. The Association
subsequently censored Inglin. Id
15. The appellants in Smiddy made the following statement of facts:
On Monday, November 19, 1973, Sgts. Varney and Nuckles worked from 8:00
A.M. to 5:30 P.M. [citation omitted]. They took their case file out to Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney Elvira Mitchell [citation omitted]. She agreed to file a criminal com-
plaint [citation omitted]. According to Sgt. Varney, from this point on the District
Attorney's Office was in control of the investigation [citiation omitted].
Appellant's Brief, supra note 12, at 38.
16. Id Appellant's Brief, supra note 12, at 43. The opening brief stated that on Decem-
ber 15, 1973, Sgts. Varney and Nuckles received word that Smiddy had posted bail and was
out of jail.
17. 665 F.2d at 264. This dismissal was pursuant to a § 995 motion. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 995 (West 1970). Section 995 requires that upon a defendant's own motion the court
in which the defendant was arraigned must set aside an information, if that court determines
that the defendant was committed without reasonable or probable cause.
18. 665 F.2d at 264.
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gently.' 9 He persuasively demonstrated that the police officers failed to
investigate adequately other suspects.2°
At the close of the trial, the defendants moved for a partial di-
rected verdict on the ground that they were not liable for any damages
suffered after November 19, 1973 because the filing of the criminal
complaint by the district attorney insulated them from liability for
damages subsequently suffered.2 1 Defendants repeated this argument
in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial.22 The defendants also requested that the jury be instructed that
the district attorney bears responsibility for gathering evidence to con-
vict or exonerate an arrested person after the filing of the complaint.2 3
The district court denied both motions and the proposed jury
instructions.24
The jury awarded Smiddy $250,000 in damages from Varney,
Nuckles, and Inglin. In addition, the district court awarded Smiddy
$250,000 in attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act
19. Appellant's Brief, supra note 12, at 1.
20. 665 F.2d at 261, 264. Varney and Nuckles did not investigate men who had
threatened Miller. For example, one factor which led to the arrest of Smiddy was informa-
tion that Miller had referred to him as "John" at a coffee shop where she had been seen for
the last time before her death. Although the police had further information that she was
afraid of a man named John, they did not investigate two former boyfriends named John.
Smiddy presented evidence at trial that both of these former boyfriends had harassed and
threatened her and that one had beaten her. Additionally, once Smiddy was arrested, inves-
tigation of other suspects stopped. Id
21. 665 F.2d at 266.
22. Id
23. Id
24. During trial at the close of the evidence, Varey and Nuckles requested a directed
verdict. They argued that the evidence showed that probable cause existed for Smiddy's
arrest as a matter of law. 665 F.2d at 265. Inglin requested a directed verdict on the theory
that his polygraph examination was not a proximate cause of Smiddy's damages. Id The
defendants renewed these requests and motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court
correctly denied these motions. 665 F.2d at 265. The court noted that the existence of prob-
able cause for Smiddy's arrest was a close issue. The court also noted, however, that its role
in reviewing the deiiial of a directed verdict in favor of a defendant was limited by the
standard set forth in Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459; 464 (9th Cir. 1977) (in
reviewing denial of a directed verdict in favor of defendant, the reviewing court must view
the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff). 665 F.2d at 266. The court pointed out
that there was conflicting evidence concerning the police officers' knowledge and what other
leads they could have pursued. Id The court emphasized that a recent decision had indi-
cated that if "reasonable persons might reach different conclusions about the facts, the estab-
lishment of those facts is for the jury, and the existence of probable cause is likewise for the
jury, upon a proper instruction about the law." Id (quoting Gilker v. Baker, 576 F.2d 245
(9th Cir. 1978)).
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of 1976.25 Varney, Nuckles, and Inglin appealed.26 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment of liability, but vacated the
amount ofjudgment.27 The Smiddy court remanded the case for a new
trial on the issue of the amount of damages; it held that the defendants
were liable for damages suffered from the time of Smiddy's arrest until
the district attorney filed charges.28 The defendants, however, were
found not liable for Smiddy's damages attributable to his incarceration
between the filing of the complaint and his release on bail after the
preliminary hearing, unless Smiddy could rebut the presumption of in-
dependence on the part of the district attorney.29
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Ninth Circuit framed its analysis of police liability under sec-
tion 1983 in terms of the common law tort concept of proximate causa-
tion.30 The court cited three cases from other circuits to support its
25. 665 F.2d at 264-66. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(West Supp. 1981) permits courts to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party
in § 1983 actions.
26. 665 F.2d at 265.
27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The Smiddy court stated that the district
court had erred in denying defendant's motion for a partial directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that defendants were not liable for damages suf-
fered after November 19, 1973. 665 F.2d at 266. Similarly, the court held that the district
court had erred in denying the jury instruction request. See supra text accompanying note
24.
28. 665 F.2d at 268.
29. Id The court noted that on remand the trier of fact must resolve the issue of
whether the loss of job opportunity was proximately caused by the arrest and whether the
arrest proximately caused any psychological damage.
30. For a general discussion of proximate causation in civil rights actions the Smiddy
court cited Arnold v. International Business Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355-58 (9th Cir.
1981) (definition of proximate causation in civil right actions); see also Martinez v. State of
California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 296 (9th Cir. 1959) (In
alleged conspiracy resulting in the wrongful incarceration of plaintiff in a state hospital for
the mentally ill, where "the injury complained of is commitment to an institution by a court
order, this order of the Court, right or wrong, is ordinarily the proximate cause of the in-
jury." Preliminary steps that occur before the court order, such as filing petitions or clerical
and procedural activities leading to the order are remote, rather than proximate, causes of
the injury); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that inaction of county
sheriff, who was obliged by statute and regulations to appoint classification committee to
consider ordering plaintifis transfer from honor camp to county jail, might have proxi-
mately caused the plaintiffs loss of accumulated earnings from work performed at the honor
camp and thus subjected sheriff to liability under § 1983); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939,
942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972) (extraction of involuntary confession by
defendant police officers did not entitle plaintiff to recover damages for his conviction and
incarceration because defendants knew, or should have known, that the confession was
inadmissible and, therefore, it was not foreseeable that the judge would erroneously admit
this unlawful confession); Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 107 (5th Cir. 1973) (an officer
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proposition that "the filing of charges under certain circumstances does
break the chain of causation between an arrest and prosecution."31
The court indicated that the filing of a complaint is, in the terminology
of tort law, a superseding intervening cause which insulates the original
actor's conduct from section 1983 liability.
32
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this result was 'just" because the
other individuals within the chain of causation who continued to hold
Smiddy33 were immune from liability under section 1983. 34 The court
announced that because police officers are the only actors in the chain
of decision who are subject to liability under section 1983, public policy
supports cutting off such liability for damage that is the result of the
intervening fault of the others in the chain.35 Additionally, the court
noted that the possibility of absolute liability on the part of the munici-
pality or other local government units further justifies limiting the lia-
acting under color of law without malice should be liable only for injuries reasonably fore-
seeable; but officers acting with malice or bad intent should be liable for injuries having a
more attenuated causal relationship); see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
31. 665 F.2d at 267. The three cases the court cited were Ames v. United States, 600
F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1979); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Rodriquez
v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc). The court, however, failed to
analyze these cases, mentioning them only briefly in a footnote. 665 F.2d at 267 n.2. The
Smiddy opinion prior to modification read: "Authorities from other circuits support this
position." Nos. 79-3078, 79-3480, slip op. at 3843 (Aug. 7, 1981) (emphasis added), modFled,
665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981). The modified opinion reads, "[a]uthorities from other circuits
lendsome support/or this position. " 665 F.2d at 267 (emphasis added). The original opinion
then stated: "Thus, it has been held that the filing of charges breaks the chain of causation
between an arrest and prosecution after the filing." Slip op. at 3843. The opinion now
reads: 'Thus it has been held that the filing of charges under certain circumstances does
break the chain of causation between an arrest and prosecution." 665 F.2d at 267 (emphasis
added).
It is not clear why the court modified the language in this way. The court might be
indicating that the cases it relied on in arriving at its decision do not provide direct prece-
dential authority for the precise factual situation before the court in Smiddy
32. 665 F.2d at 267. In the original opinion, prior to modification, the court's language
lacked precision. However, this was the apparent meaning of the court's message in stating
that "[w]e need not make [the policeman's lot] more unfortunate by holding the officer liable
for damage that is the result of the intervening/ault of others in the chaim " Nos. 79-3078, 79-
3480, slip op. at 3844 (Aug. 7, 1981), mod/ed, 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis ad-
ded). In the modified opinion, the court used more precise tort terminology in discussing the
presumption. The court stated: "Where the plaintiff has introduced evidence to rebut the
presumption, the burden remains on the defendant to prove that an independent intervening
cause cuts off his tort liability. " 665 F.2d at 267 (emphasis added); see PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 834-50 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 comment d (1977);
Annot., 21 A.L.R. 2d 643, 647-717 (1952).
33. Other individuals in the chain might include, for example, the district attorney and
the municipal court judge.
34. 665 F.2d at 267. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
35. I.d
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bility of the police officers.36 Apparently, the court reasoned that such
liability on the part of the municipality offers an injured plaintiff suffi-
cient redress.
37
In essence, the Smiddy court effectively "immunized" law enforce-
ment agents from liability for damages under section 1983 incurred
subsequent to the initiation of legal process.38 Accordingly, it is neces-
sary to scrutinize this new immunity against the background of the pol-
36. The court cited Comment, Strict Liability Under 1983for Municopal Deprivation of
Federal Rights?: Owen v. City of Independence, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 153 (1980). The
article discusses Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), which denied munici-
palities a qualified immunity from § 1983 suits. The author asserted that the Owen decision
was in line with prior authority and with the intent of the framers of the Civil Rights Act of
1876, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). However, the author questioned the Owen court's apparent sanc-
tion of strict municipal liability for § 1983 violations.
37. In Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978), the
Court held that a municipality is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 and thus subject
to liability under the Act. However, the Monell court held that a municipality cannot be
held liable on a respondeat superior theory. To recover, a plaintiff must prove that the al-
leged unconstitutional action was an implementation of an official municipal policy or cus-
tom. While under Monell it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove that the municipality.
formally approved the custom, the plaintiffs hurdle in demonstrating that such a custom did
exist should not be underestimated.
If § 1983 is to serve as a remedy for a wronged plaintiff, making a plaintiff resort to an
action against a municipality would often prove futile because of the additional burden of
proving custom. By the same token, if § 1983 is to serve as a deterrent, cutting off police
liability in the hopes of holding the municipality liable certainly will not effectively deter
police. Moreover, it will often be so difficult to prove "custom" that the deterrent value of
§ 1983 will be meaningless.
38. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of immu-
nities. The immunity proposed by the Smiddy court was limited in scope because it was
only presumed and could be rebutted Id According to the Smiddy court, however, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of producing some evidence to rebut the presumption of
independence on the part of the prosecutor. Id Although the defendant is generally re-
quired to plead immunity as an affirmative defense under § 1983, Smiddy seems to indicate
the contrary. Id at 267-68.
The plaintiff argues that even if the filing of the criminal complaint normally insu-
lates police officers from liability for subsequent damages, the defendants have
waived the argument in this case because they failed to plead it as an affirmative
defense as required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We disa-
gree. In California, 'Once the district attorney has filed a complaint, it is his re-
sponsibility to gather and present such evidence as will convict the guilty or
exonerate the innocent.' [citation omitted]. There is a presumption of indepen-
dence on the part of the district attorney where plaintiff has not presented evidence
to challenge that presumption. For example, plaintiff might contend that the pros-
ecutor acted under pressure from the police or relied on the police investigation
and arrest when he filed the complaint, instead of making an independent judg-
ment on the existence of probable cause for the arrest. [citation omitted]. Where
the plaintiff has introduced evidence to rebut the presumption, the burden remains
on the defendant to prove that an independent intervening cause cuts off his tort
liability. Fed. R. Evid. 301. If for reasons of privilege or otherwise the relevant
evidence is not available, no presumption will arise.
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icies underlying section 1983 and the historical development of
judicially created immunities under the Act.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Historical Precedent for Immunities Under Section 1983
1. Background of immunities
The scope of a law enforcement officers' immunity from liability
under section 1983 is determined by statutory interpretation.39 Thus,
the analysis begins with the statute itself.40 It is apparent that in enact-
665 F.2d at 267-68, quoting Tribulski v. County of Los Angeles, 83 Cal. App. 3d 828, 831,
146 Cal. Rptr. 229-30 (1978).
In the original opinion, prior to modification, the last sentence of the above quotation
read: "Since there is a presumption of independence on the part of the district attorney, it is
appropriate to place the burden on the plaintiff to overcome that presumption." Nos. 79-
3078, 79-3480 slip op. at 3844 (Aug. 7, 1981), modfed, 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981).
The language of the original opinion evinces a stronger intention by the court to place
the initial burden on the plaintiff. Hence, it would be unnecessary for the defendant to plead
immunity as an affirmative defense. Despite the change, the modified opinion still lends
itself to the interpretation that this immunity need not to be pled as an affirmative defense.
An alternative conclusion may be reached by reading both the original and modified
opinions. Arguably, the court may not be eliminating the necessity of pleading immunity as
an affirmative defense. Rather, the court could simply be rejecting the plaintifi's contention
that, under Rule 8, a defendant waives the right to assert immunity as an affirmative defense
by failing to plead it originally. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 8 provides: "e) Affirmative Defenses. In
pleading . . . a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense."
Under either interpretation, the immunity created in Smiddy may present more of a
hurdle for a plaintiff than does the traditional qualified immunity available to police officers.
Normally, the defendant is required to plead to a qualfFed immunity as an affirmative de-
fense. See generaly Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980), where the Court held that in a
1983 action against a public official whose position might entitle him to qual ied immunity,
the plaintiff need not allege that defendant acted in bad faith in order to state a claim for
relief; rather, the burden is on defendant to plead good faith as an affirmative defense. In
contrast to Gomez, the Smiddy court placed the initial burden on the plaintiff to produce
some evidence that the prosecutor exercised independent judgment in filing a criminal com-
plaint, thus qualitatively changing the defendant's burden.
39. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (a municipality has no immunity
under § 1983 from liability flowing from its constitutional violation, and may not assert the
good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability). Since § 1983 contains no specific
provisions for immunities, courts have looked to the congressional debates surrounding the
passage of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, the forerunner of § 1983, to
determine whether Congress intended to create any immunities. The Supreme Court has
held that although § 1983 does not refer to immunities, the law "is to be read in harmony
with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them."
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976); see Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376
(1951); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 666 (1980) (Powell, J.
dissenting).
40. Section 1983 is set forth supra note 1.
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ing section 1983 Congress intended to create a broad remedy for viola-
tions of federally protected civil rights.41 Recently, in Gomez v.
Toledo,42 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that section 1983 must be con-
strued liberally to further the primary remedial purpose of vindicating
important human rights.43 By its terms, section 1983 "creates a species
of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities and some courts
have suggested that it be applied as stringently as it reads." 44
Accordingly, the courts must not create a new immunity under
section 1983 cavalierly. Despite the sweeping language of section 1983
and the statute's silence regarding the incorporation of common lawimmunities, the United States Supreme Court has occasionally carved
out either absolute or qualified immunities from liability in section
1983 suits.4" The Court has done so, however, only upon a finding that
the immunity was firmly rooted in the common law and was supported
by strong policy reasons.46 The Court has reasoned that in enacting
section 1983, Congress was well aware of the general body of common
law immunities which existed at that time, and the public policy behind
them.47 Thus, Congress would have specifically provided for the abro-
gation of these common law immunities had it so intended.48 While in
some cases the Supreme Court has found that there may be immunities
under section 1983, in every case it has (1) engaged in lengthy discus-
sion of the policies behind section 1983; (2) inquired into the existence
41. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1977).
42. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
43. Id at 638-39. In Gomez, the Supreme Court stated: "This statute, enacted to aid in
the 'preservation of human liberty and human rights'. . . reflects a congressional judgment
that a damages remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for
vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees." Id (citation omitted); see also Monell v.
New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1977); Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
44. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); see also Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980). In Owen, the Supreme Court stated:
Its language is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any privileges,
immunities, or defenses that may be asserted. Rather, the Act imposes liability
upon "everyperson," who, under color of state law or custom, "subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
Id at 635.
45. For the definition of absolute immunities and qualified immunities see supra note
10. For examples of such judicially carved immunities see infra note 49 and accompanying
text.
46. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 412 (1976); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,
639 (1980); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980).
47. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 637 (1980).
48. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980).
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of a common law immunity of the relevant official; and (3) examined
the policy behind the common law immunity.49
Finally, in each case the Court has determined whether the poli-
cies behind such common law immunities were compatible with the
policies of section 1983. Only after finding such compatibility has the
Court recognized parallel immunities under section 1983.50 In estab-
lishing immunities under section 1983, the Court has asked two ques-
tions: (1) Did the immunity exist at common law; and (2) Do the same
considerations of public policy countenance recognition of the immu-
nity under section 1983?1' This two-part test has resulted in the Court's
49. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 622, 634 (1980), citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555
(1967); see, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (after tracing the develop-
ment of absolute legislative privilege from its source in 16th Century England to its inclu-
sion in the federal and state constitutions, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress
would not impinge on a "tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclu-
sion in the general language. . .[of § 1983]"); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622 (1980); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).
For examples of the creation of other immunities under § 1983, see Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (holding that absolute immunity, traditionally accorded judges, and
qualfed immunity for police were preserved under § 1983 and noting that "[flew doctrines
were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for
damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. . . ."); see also Procunier v.
Navarelle, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (qual&fed immunity for prison officials and officers); Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors initiating and present-
ing the state's case); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (qual#Fed immunity for
superintendent of state hospital); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (qualfied immu-
nity for local board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (qualfied "good
faith" immunity for state governor and other executive officers for discretionary acts per-
formed in the course of official conduct).
But see Comment, 4 New Perspective on Legislative Immunity in Section 1983 Actions,
28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1087 (1981) [hereinafter cited as New Perspectives]. The comment dis-
cusses the policies behind § 1983 as read against the judically created immunities. The au-
thor specifically discusses the recent development of legislative immunities under § 1983,
focusing on the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). Noting a trend by the United
States Supreme Court to expand common law legislative immunity to § 1983 actions, despite
the potential impact on civil right litigants, the author notes that this expansion of immunity
confficts with both the language and the spirit of § 1983. The author further notes that this
current trend may "render unenforceable the rights protected by § 1983, thus giving rise to
the very result which the 42nd Congress sought to avoid." New Perspectives, supra at 1090.
50. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). Although the Owen Court
insisted that it had only granted immunities when they existed at the time of the enactment
of the statute, this has not actually been the case. For example, in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976), the Court looked at common law for a history of prosecutorial immunity,
and found such an immunity rooted in common law tradition. However, that immunity
dates back only to 1896, almost two decades after the enactment of§ 1983. Thus, it is possi-
ble to view the decision in Imbler as an expansion of the common law immunity concept by
fashioning an immunity that does not pre-date § 1983.
51. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976).
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refusal to accord all officials the same immunity which was allowed at
common law.
5 2
The Smiddy court does not appear to have applied this two-part
test in creating a new immunity for police officers under section 1983.
The court never addressed the first prong of the test; the opinion is void
of any analysis of common law police immunities. As for the second
prong, the court, in its discussion of the unfortunate lot of the police-
man,5 3 did advance policy reasons for cutting off police liability after
the filing of a complaint. The court failed, however, to relate these
policies to the policies underlying section 1983. In fact, in the only
instance where the court discussed the policies of "immunizing" the
police in terms of section 1983, it merely concluded that police officers
are entitled to such immunity because they are the "only actor[s] in the
chain of decisions leading to prosecution who [are] subject to section
1983 liability;' 54 therefore, it would be unfair to hold them "liable for
damage that is the result of the intervening fault of others in the
chain. 55 Comparison of the Smiddy opinion with prior judicial con-
sideration of police immunity under section 1983 demonstates the
Smiddy court's failure to relate its policy considerations to the policies
behind section 1983.
2. The first recognition of a qualified immunity for police officers.
In Pierson v. Ray56 the Supreme Court applied its two-part test to
determine whether police officers are entitled to immunity under sec-
tion 1983. In Pierson, three police officers had arrested the petitioners
for attempting to use segregated facilities at an interstate bus terminal
in Jackson, Mississippi. The petitioners were charged and convicted of
violating a Mississippi law, later held invalid.57 One petitioner was
52. Immunizing the Prosecutor, supra note 2, at 1115. For example, in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court held that executive officials, who are absolutely
immune at common law, were only entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983. This
immunity attached on the "existence of reasonable ground for belief formed at the time and
in light of all circumstances, coupled with a good faith belief' that their behavior complied
with constitutional constraints. Id at 247-48. See generally, Immunizing The Prosecutor,
supra note 2, at 115, 116; Note Section 1983 and the Limits of Prosecutorial Immunity, 56
CHI. KENT L. REv. 1029, 1032 (1980) (discussion of prosecutorial immunity in terms of the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. de.
nied in part, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
53. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
54. Smiddy v. Vamey, 665 F.2d 261, 267 (1981).
55. Id
56. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
57. Id The petitioner had been arrested and charged with breach of the peace in viola-
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granted a trial de novo resulting in a directed verdict. The charges
against the others were dropped. Petitioners then brought suit in fed-
eral district court alleging that the police officers violated section
1983.5
The Court held that the defenses of good faith and probable cause,
which were available to police officers in common law actions for false
arrest and false imprisonment, were also available to them in an action
under section 1983.19 In reaching this conclusion, the Court first estab-
lished that the common law had never granted police officers an abso-
lute or unqualified immunity.60 The Court, however, then analogized
the section 1983 tort claim to the common law tort of false arrest. The
Court noted that "[u]nder the prevailing view in this country, a peace
officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false
arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved."6
To support this analogy of section 1983 actions to common law tort
actions, the Pierson Court quoted from its holding in Monroe v. Pape:62
Section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability
"63
Moreover, the Court found significant policy reasons for extending
common law qualified immunity for police offiers to actions under sec-
tion 1983: "A police officer's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose
between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest
when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he
does."164 Thus, in arriving at its decision to grant police officers a quali-
fied immunity under section 1983, the Supreme Court cautiously mea-
sured its decision against common law immunities.
Without undertaking a similarly careful analysis, 65 the Smiddy
court appears to have announced that police officers enjoy an immunity
from liability even absent the defenses of good faith or probable cause
necessary to the immunity created in Pierson. 66 Never pointing to a
tion of § 2087.5 of the Mississippi Code. The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and reversed the judgments in Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965).
58. Id at 550.
59. Id at 557. The Pierson Court also established an immunity for judges.
60. Id at 555.
61. Id (citing Ward v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 179 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1950); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 (1965).
62. 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
63. 386 U.S. at 556-58.
64. Id at 555.
65. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 68-74 and accom-
panying text; supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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parallel type of police immunity under the common law torts of false
arrest and false imprisonment, the Smiddy court created an immunity
under section 1983 that was different from either the absolute or quali-
fied immunity heretofore recognized by the Supreme Court. By creat-
ing a rebuttable presumption, the Smiddy court granted police officers
something less than absolute immunity; yet, by placing the burden on
the plaintiff to produce some evidence to rebut the presumption that
the prosecutor exercised independent judgment, the court granted po-
lice officers something more than a qualified immunity.67 Whether the
Smiddy court properly recognized such an immunity for police, which
exists even absent good faith and probable cause, is a question answer-
able only by careful scrutiny of common law tort principles of proxi-
mate cause and precedents applying those principles to section 1983
actions.
3. The Smiddy court's authority for creation of immunity
The Smiddy opinion must be measured against the backdrop of
judicial reluctance to expand immunities under section 1983, absent al-
ready existing common law immunities and strong policy considera-
tions.68 The Smiddy court did not analyze prior immunity precedents,
common law tradition, or section 1983 policy concerns. The court
merely stated that "[a]uthorities from other circuits lend some support
for this position. Thus, it has been held that the filing of charges under
certain circumstances does break the chain of causation between an ar-
rest and prosecution."69 Specifically, the court cited three cases: Ames
v. United States,7 ° Dellums v. Powel, 7' and Rodriguez v. Ritchey. 72
Without analyzing those cases, 73 the court announced:
67. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
69. 665 F.2d 261,267 (9th Cir. 1981). Prior to modification the opinion read: "Authori-
ties from other circuits support this position. Thus it has been held that the filing of charges
breaks the chain of causation between an arrest and prosecution after the filing. Nos. 79-
3078, 79-3480, slip op. at 3843 (August 7, 1981) (citation ommitted) (emphasis added), modi-
fied 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981).
In comparing the original opinion with the later modification, the court appears to con-
cede that there is no precedent directly supporting this new immunity. By changing the first
sentence from "authorities from other circuits support this position" to "authorities from
other circuits lend some support to this position," the court equivocated. Furthermore, the
addition of "under certain circumstances" in the second sentence indicates the court's uncer-
tainty as to whether there is any real support for the proposition it has created.
70. 600 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1979).
71. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
72. 556 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
73. The court briefly relates the facts of the case in a footnote. 665 F.2d 261, 267 n.2.
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Thus, we hold that where police officers do not act mali-
ciously or with reckless disregard for the rights of an arrested
person, they are not liable for damages suffered by the ar-
rested person after a district attorney files charges unless the
presumption of independent judgment by the district attorney
is rebutted.74
In light of prior Supreme Court decisions, however, an analysis of the
three cases that the Smiddy court cited is crucial to a critical under-
standing of the opinion.
In Rodriguez, 75 the plaintiff sued the arresting officers for false ar-
rest pursuant to a grand jury indictment. A criminal investigation had
focused on the plaintiff as a result of a series of bizarre coincidences
and "innocent mistakes."7 6 Because of mistaken identity, investigators
brought Ms. Rodriguez before a grand jury which indicted her on gam-
bling charges. Arrest warrants were immediately issued and two police
That note is the extent of the court's discussion of these cases. Seesupra note 31 and accom-
panying text.
74. 665 F.2d at 267. The opinion prior to modification read: "We join these circuits by
holding that police officers are not liable for damages suffered by an arrested person after a
district attorney files charges unless the presumption of independent judgment by the district
attorney is rebutted." Nos. 79-3078, 79-3480, slip op. at 3844 (Aug. 7, 1981), modified, 665
F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981).
By changing the beginning of the sentence to "thus we hold" in the modification, the
court again seems to concede that rather than relying on precedent it has merely analogized
to "similar" holdings in other circuits in an effort to support its holding. These "similar"
holdings are based on facts which are readily distinguishable from the Smiddy case. See
supra note 69. When this failure to rely on precedent is coupled with the modifications
discussed in this Note, it appears that the Smiddy court has resorted to bootstrapping to
achieve the result it wanted - the limitation of police liability.
In modifying its opinion the court excluded police conduct that is malicious or that
displays reckless disregard for the rights of an arrested person from its new immunity. The
court seems to be suggesting that for constitutional purposes, the immunity will apply to
those acts which could be classified as negligent, as opposed to those that are intentional.
75. 556 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
76. Id at 1187-88. The FBI, conducting a massive investigation into illegal gambling
activities in Florida, placed a judicially sanctioned tap and pen register on the suspect's
telephone. During the period of the wiretap the suspect telephoned the number 935-0024
and spoke with a woman named "Margo" about gambling activities. The pen register mal-
functioned and incorrectly recorded the number dialed as 935-9024. The FBI assigned agent
Arnwine to identify "Margo." An officer of General Telephone Company identified the
subscriber of 935-9024 as the plaintiff, Margaret S. Rodriguez. The number was actually that
of a pay phone. Arnwine, not knowing of the error, believed that he had identified
"Margo." Id at 1187. He discovered that Margaret S. Rodriguez operated a home-con-
ducted business called "Margo's Beauty Salon." Upon asking a Tampa vice squad detective
if he had ever encountered a Margaret or "Margo" Rodriguez in any of his gambling inves-
tigations, the detective stated that he had investigated a Margaret Rodriguez who owned a
beauty parlor. This person was not the plaintiff, but a namesake who was facing state crimi-
nal charges for gambling.
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agents arrested Ms. Rodriguez. Five hours later, she obtained release
on bail. A year later, during pretrial discovery, Ms. Rodriguez' attor-
ney discovered the mistake, and the government dismissed the indict-
ment against her.7 7 Ms. Rodriguez then filed suit in federal court
against the arresting officers and other known investigative agents
claiming a violation of her fourth amendment rights. She claimed
there was no probable cause for her arrest because her indictment had
resulted from negligent police conduct.78 The district court granted the
defendant police officers' motion for summary judgment, and found
that the officers had acted in good faith and with probable cause.7 9
On appeal, a divided panel affirmed the lower court in part. The
majority determined that a Bivens type8° action had successfully been
alleged, but agreed with the district court that the defendants were enti-
tled to a good faith defense. The majority conceded, however, that a
triable issue of fact existed as to whether one of the agents had acted in
good faith."'
On rehearing en banc, a plurality remanded with directions to dis-
miss. 82 The Rodriguez court first noted that while Ms. Rodriguez' com-
plaint alleged only a constitutional claim, a fourth amendment
violation, a federal common law claim of false arrest or false imprison-
ment implicitly existed from the facts cited in her complaint. There-
fore, the court undertook a two-part analysis asking (1) whether the
complaint stated a cause of action under the constitution, and (2)
whether the plaintiff had successfully alleged a claim under federal
common law.
83
The plurality found that the complaint failed to allege a constitu-
tional violation and held that an arrest pursuant to an indictment issued
by a properl constituted grandjury did not violate thefourth amendment
77. 556 F.2d at 1188. Ms. Rodriguez's attorney learned of the mistake during pretrial
discovery when he was permitted to listen to the tape conversations. At that point he real-
ized that the female voice recorded was not that of his client. Id
78. Id
79. Id
80. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Bivens involved a damage action based on unconstitutional search and seizure by
federal narcotics agents. In Bivens, the Supreme Court created a cause of action against
individuals acting under color offederal authority parallel to the statutory cause of action
created by § 1983 against individuals acting under color of state authority. Id at 397. This
cause of action is commonly known as a Bivens cause of action.
81. 556 F.2d at 1189.
82. Id. at 1194.
83. Id at 1189.
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or federal common law. 4 The Rodriguez court reasoned that a grand
jury indictment conclusively determined the existence of probable
cause and provided authority for the issuance of an arrest warrant."
The Rodriguez holding contrasts sharply with the Smiddy decision,
which found a fourth amendment violation, but cut off liability after a
certain point.86 The Rodriguez court did not develop a new immunity
from constitutional tort claims, but rather, relied on the recognized
common law immunities of good faith and probable cause in false ar-
rest actions and concluded that a grand jury's independent determina-
tion of probable cause provided authority for the arresting officer.87
Unlike Rodriguez, the Smiddy court appears to have developed a new
immunity which attaches after the determination of a constitutional
violation.
In fact, the Rodriguez court's discussion of the causation presump-
tion, upon which the Smiddy court relied, did not come into play until
84. Id (emphasis added).
85. Id at 1191 (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 612 n.11 (1974); United
States v. Green, 499 F.2d 538, 540-41 (1974); United States v. Perkins, 533 F.2d 1182, 1187
(1970); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950); United States ex rel
Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U.S. 396 (1935); Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 249-51
(1932)).
The court stated that "the conclusion to be drawn is readily apparent: Since there was
no unconstitutional arrest, no claim has been stated under the Bivens rationale." 556 F.2d at
1191 (citing La Bar v. Royer, 528 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1976)).
Indeed, the Court in Rodriguez noted that Ms. Rodriguez's complaint should have been
dismissed for want of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. 556 F.2d at 1192 (discussing
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
86. 665 F.2d at 265-67.
87. In a concurring opinion, Justice Hill agreed with the conclusion that an indictment
by a grand jury conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and provides au-
thority for the arrest warrant to issue. However, Justice Hill cautioned against the possibil-
ity of drawing an inference from the Rodriguez holding that "indictment by a properly
constituted grand jury immunizes all precedent conduct of investigative and prosecutorial
authorities." Id at 1194-95 (concurring opinion). While Justice Hill agreed that an officer
who executes an arrest warrant that is issued by a properly constituted grand jury cannot
later be held liable for an unconstitutional arrest, he cautioned against allowing an officer
who maliciously or in bad faith sought to obtain such a grand jury indictment to escape
responsibility simply by showing that he did "such a good job that the grand jury indicted."
Id at 1195.
Six justices on the Fifth Circuit joined in a scathing dissent. The dissent first took issue
with the view that the grand jury indictment was independent, and thus cut off liability on
the part of the police for an unconstitutional arrest. Id at 1201 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
The dissent also disagreed with the plurality's exemption of negligent acts committed by the
investigating official from constitutional liability. Id at 1202. Further, the dissent took issue
with the plurality's "unbounded deference" to a grand jury's determination of probable
cause. Id at 1204. Finally, the dissent questioned the plurality's lack of concern about the
agent's conduct antecedent to the arrest. Id at 1205.
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the Rodriguez court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to allege a
constitutional violation. That presumption was discussed only in terms
of plaintiff's claim for relief under federal common law. The Rodriguez
court held, however, that the "common law false imprisonment theory
[was] not applicable to the activity of either the investigative or the
arresting agents" in the case before it because (1) a valid arrest is not a
false arrest; (2) if the facts supporting the arrest are put before an inter-
mediate, such as a magistrate or a grand jury, the intermediate's deci-
sion breaks the causal chain and insulates an initiating party; and (3)
one engaged in investigatory work is not generally liable for false
arrest.8s
The entire Rodriguez discussion of the common law false arrest
cause of action is irrelevant to Smiddy because the plaintiff in Smiddy
alleged, and the jury found, a constitutional violation arising from a
warrantless arrest without probable cause.8 9 Thus, even if tort concepts
were applicable, the Rodriguez principles do not apply to Smiddy be-
cause of the distinguishable facts. Additionally, the Rodriguez plurality
indicated that general state tort law is not always directly applicable to
constitutionl torts.90 Moreover, the precedential value of Rodriguez is
further diminished because Rodriguez is a plurality opinion with a vig-
orous dissent.9'
The second case that the Smiddy court relied upon, Dellums v.
Powell,92 is similarly distinguishable and thus unsupportive of the
Smiddy holding. In Dellums, a group of demonstrators who had been
arrested during a demonstration on the steps of the United States Capi-
tol building, and the congressman who was addressing them at the time
of the arrest, brought a Bivens93 cause of action against Police Chief
Powell for a fourth amendment violation, i.e., an illegal seizure. Their
complaint also contained pendant claims for false arrest, false impris-
onment and malicious prosecution. 94 After the arrest, Chief Powell at-
tended a meeting with three assistant United States attorneys, one of
whom, Zimmerman, had been an eyewitness to the event precipitating
the arrests. Powell and Zimmerman related their story, and on that
88. Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1047 (1978).
89. Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 267 (9th Cir. 1981).
90. 556 F.2d at 1193 n.35 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1961)). "[G]eneral
tort law and the fourth amendment cannot be perfectly equated . " Id
91. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
92. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
93. See supra note 80.
94. 566 F.2d at 175.
Vol. 16
POLICE IMMUNITIES
information, the assistant United States attorneys decided to prosecute
a test case against eight of the arrestees. The test case failed, and the
prosecutor dismissed charges against the others.95
In a subsequent civil suit against Chief Powell arising from the
arrests of the demonstrators, the jury found him liable for false arrest,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and for a Bivens claim
based on violations of the first and fourth amendments.96 On appeal
the court noted that "[t]he tort action of false arrest in both its common
law and constitutional variants protects and vindicates the interest in
freedom from unwarranted interference with personal liberty. "97 The
court recognized that an officer is justified in making an arrest only if
acting with probable cause or in good faith,98 and held that under the
facts before it the jury could properly conclude that Chief Powell had
failed to establish adequately either defense. Accordingly, the court
upheld the damage award for these violations.99
The Dellums court then addressed plaintiffs claim against Chief
Powell for malicious prosecution. The jury found against Chief Powell
on the plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim and awarded $3,000 to
eight class members who stood trial on the criminal charges, and $50 to
all other class members. On appeal, Powell asserted that the evidence
was insufficient to show that his actions caused the filing of criminal
charges against the class of plaintiffs. He argued that the arrest did not
constitute institution of criminal charges as defined in the law of mali-
cious prosecution."° Rather, he asserted that it is the filing of a formal
95. Id at 191-92.
96. Id at 174, 175; see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
97. 566 F.2d at 175 (emphasis added).
98. Id The court noted that this would be true under the Bivens cause of action as well
as false arrest and false imprisonment causes of action. The court stated:
The mechanics of pleading and proof in a Bivens action for false arrest are in our
judgment identical to those sketched [for false arrest and false imprisonment]. Al-
though we know of no case delineating the parameters of aprimafae case under
a Bivens false arrest theory, Pierson v. Ray. . .indicates that the details of consti-
tutional tort actions should be shaped by reference to the parallel common law.
4d at 175 (citations omitted).
99. 566 F.2d at 197 n.89.
100. Id at 191. "Malicious prosecution has four elements: (1) the defendant must be
bund to have instituted a criminal action against the plaintiff; (2) [the] prosecution must
ave ended in the plaintiff's favor, (3) there must have been no probable cause to initiate the
riminal proceeding[s]; and (4) the defendant must have acted maliciously." Id at 191 n.65
:iting 1 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 46 at 321 (1956)) [hereinafter
"ARPER & JAMES]. See also PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 835-47 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
:tOSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
ECOND)].
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information that triggers such tort liability.10'
In analyzing Chief Powel's malicious prosecution argument, the
court stated that the factors that led to the decision to prosecute 0 2
raised an issue of causation of first impression in the District of Colum-
bia. 03 The court first noted that the tort of malicious prosecution di-
rectly and primarily protects the "interest in freedom from unjusifiable
and unreasonable litigation."I' The tort protects only secondarily
other interests, such as those in reputation, property, or liberty. The
court then reasoned that an injury to those interests which are seconda-
rily protected by the tort cause of action is insufficient to support liabil-
ity for malicious prosecution absent injury to the interest primarily
protected.105 For example, despite the significant deprivation of liberty
resulting from an arrest, a police officer who unreasonably or mali-
ciously arrests an individual without an arrest warrant cannot be held
for malicious prosecution unless an information or indictment was
filed.'
0 6
Thus, according to the court, the relevant question was whether
Chief Powell was sufficiently involved in triggering the filing of the in-
formation to overcome a presumption of independent action by the
United States attorneys.10 7 The court held that although there was evi-
dence from which the jury could have concluded that Chief Powell pro-
cured the filing of the information by making misrepresentations, Chief
Powell was entitled to a new tiial on the malicious prosecution claim.
The court reached this conclusion by determining that the district court
had erred in instructing the jury that it "must find that 'the defendant
101. 566 F.2d at 191.
102. For a discussion of the factors leading to the decision to file the information see 566
F.2d at 191-92.
103. 566 F.2d at 192.
104. Id (quoting HARPER & JAMES, supra note 100, § 4.1 at 301) (emphasis added).
105. 566 F.2d at 192.
106. Id & n.71 (citing Auerbach v. Freeman, 43 App. D.C. 176 (D.C. Cir. 1915)). Courts
have also held that a private citizen who knowingly and maliciously presents false informa-
tion to an official but who fails to cause process to issue cannot be held liable for malicious
prosecution. Id at 192. See also Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1942); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 100, comment c.
107. 566 F.2d at 192; see supra note 104 and accompanying text. Additionally, the court
stated:
The law is clear that the chain of causation between Chief Powell and the filing of
the informations against plaintiffs is broken - thereby defeating tort liability - if
the decision made by attorney Moore [assistant United States attorney] was in-
dependent of any pressure or influence exerted by Chief Powell and of any know-





instituted a criminal proceeding.' "108 The court held that this was er-
ror because the district court failed to instruct the jury on the definition
of the limited meaning of the word "instituted" in the context of the
case. 109
The part of the Dellums opinion on which the Smiddy court relied
involved only the common law tort of malicious prosecution." 0 In
Smiddy, however, the plaintiff claimed an invasion of a constitutionally
protected interest, his fourth amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable arrest."' These torts protect distinct interests and involve con-
cepts which are mutually inconsistent." 2 The distinction between the
torts lies in the "regularity of the legal process under which the plain-
tiffs interests have been invaded.""' When a plaintiff is arrested and
confined without a warrant or a legal authority apart from the warrant,
the essence of the tort is the perversion of legal procedure and the rem-
edy is false imprisonment. Conversely, if there is a validprocess or due
authority apart from it, "the arrest is not 'false" and the action must
be for malicious prosecution."14
Thus, in Dellums, while the court recognized a presumption of in-
dependence on the part of the prosecutor, it did not speak of this pre-
sumption in terms of immunizing Police Chief Powell from damages
which flowed from the constitutional tort of arrest without probable
cause. Rather, the court spoke of this presumption only for the purpose
of facilitating Chief Powel's defense to the common law tort action of
malicious prosecution.
108. 566 F.2d at 193.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
111. 665 F.2d at 264. Courts have noted that an illegal arrest in violation of the fourth
amendment, and common law torts of false arrest and false imprisonment invade identical
interests, i.e., freedom from unwarranted interference with personal liberty. 566 F.2d at 175;
see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
112. Prosser has contrasted the torts of false arrest/false imprisonment with the tort of
malicious prosecution, stating:
The distinction between [malicious prosecution and false arrest] lies in the exist-
ence of valid legal authority for the restraint imposed. If the defendant complies
with the formal requirements of the law, as by swearing out a valid warrant, so that
the arrest of the plaintiff is legally authorized, the court and its officers are not his
agents to make the arrest, and their acts are those of the law in the state, and not to
be imputed to him. He is therefore liable, if at all, only for a misuse of legal pro-
cess to effect a valid arrest for an improper purpose. . . .The weight of modem
authority is that where the defendant has attempted to comply with legal require-
ments, and has failed to do so through no fault of his own, false imprisonment will
not lie and the remedy is malicious prosecution.
PROSSER, supra note 100, at 49 & 835.
113. PROSSER, supra note 100 at 49.
114. Id
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Policy reasons may, however, exist for extending the causation
presumption created by Dellums for malicious prosecution torts to con-
stitutional torts. The presumption would thus limit police liability in
section 1983 tort actions.' 15 For example, a California appellate court
recently announced a policy of automatically cutting off police liability
after the beginning of the process in actions under the California Tort
Claims Act. In so doing the court effectively subordinates the hard-
ships suffered by some individuals "in favor of 'promoting the fearless
and effective administration of the law for the whole people by protect-
ing public officers from vindictive and retaliatory damage
suits'. .. ."116 This policy avoids the chilling effect and impediments
to law enforcement which would result if public officers and public
prosecutors were to be held liable for their official conduct. 1 7 Yet, the
Smiddy court failed to discuss these possible policy reasons and to
measure them against the policies behind section 1983. The preceden-
tial value of Dellums therefore, is diminished in reference to section
1983 cases which require a careful consideration of policy before pro-
viding such immunization.
Finally, the Smiddy court's reliance uponAmes v. United States" 8
is misplaced. InAmes, the plaintiff brought an action for abuse of pro-
cess, false arrest, and false imprisonment, alleging illegal acts and omis-
sions of agents and employees of the Department of Justice, the
Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
United States Attorney. The district court dismissed the complaint." 9
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that (1) the abuse of process, false
arrest, and false imprisonment actions were barred by the Federal Tort
115. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
116. Jackson v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. App. 3d 579, 586, 175 Cal. Rptr. 395, 399
(1981) (quoting Collins v. City of San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 678-79, 123 Cal. Rptr.
525, 529 (1975)); White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 729, 235 P.2d 209, 212 (1951)). But see
Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 5 CAL. LAW REVISION COM. REP.
406-15 (1963) (a study conducted by Professor Van Alstyne prior to the California legisla-
ture's adoption of the California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West
1980)). In his report, Professor Van Alstyne asked the legislature to consider "the interest in
protecting an innocent citizen against the expense, inconvenience and disgrace of being
forced to defend against unjustified. . . charges of crime." Id at 413. The California Law
Revision Commission accordingly recommended liability for public entities under such ma-
licious prosecution situations. However, the Legislature rejected the creation of such liabil-
ity; rather it enacted Gov'T CODE §§ 821-26 creating absolute liability for the tort of
malicious prosecution. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
117. Jackson v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. App. 3d 579, 582, 175 Cal. Rptr. 395, 396
(1981).
118. 600 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1979).
119. Id at 184.
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Claims Act,1 20 and (2) plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution failed
to state a cause of action in the absence of allegations that the
defendants initiated orprocured the institution of the grand jury indict-
ment aganist the plaintiff.'2 '
The court stated that "[tihe tort of malicious prosecution is trig-
gered by institution of criminal proceedings," i.e., the the return of the
grand jury indictment.'22 The court reasoned that the acts allegedly
committed by the defendants without probable cause and with mal-
ice-arresting Ames, confining him, and placing a lien upon his prop-
erty-all occurred subsequent to the grand jury indictment. 23 Thus,
they could not be construed as initiating or procuring criminal proceed-
ings. Moreover, the court, relying on Rodriguez
124 and Dellums A25
held that absent specific allegations of the presentation of false evi-
dence or the withholding of evidence from the grand jury, "the grand
jury indictment breaks any chain of causation linking the employees'
activities to the institution of criminal proceedings, thus insulating the
F.B.I. and Justice Department employees .. 126
As in Dellums, the discussion of liability inAmes involved the tort
of malicious prosecution. 27 Since the Smiddy court failed to articulate
policies for extending the malicious prosecution rationale to fourth
amendment violations, the Smiddy court's reliance on Ames is mis-
placed. Moreover, the Ames court's discussion of causation has a logi-
cal consistency lacking in Smiddy. Because the arrest and confinement
in Ames took place after the grand jury proceeding, it would be illogi-
cal to say that these actions "caused" the institution of criminal pro-
ceedings. By contrast, in Smiddy, there is no question that Smiddy's
illegal arrest was at least a "but for" cause128 of his confinement, not
120. Id at 184-85 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (amended 1974)). The plaintiffs complaint
was barred by the Act because the only acts and omissions upon which liability could be
based occurred prior to the effective date of an amendment to the Act which allowed recov-
ery for false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Id at
185.
121. Id
122. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 100, at §§ 653(a)(b) comment c.
123. Id
124. 556 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1977). See supra notes 72, 75-91 and accompanying text.
125. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). See supra notes 92-
117 and accompanying text.
126. 600 F.2d at 185.
127. See supra notes 100 & 112 and accompanying text.
128. Prosser defines "but for" causes as follows:
The defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have oc-
curred without it. At most this must be a rule of exclusion: if the event would not
have occurred 'but for' the defendant's negligence it still does not follow that there
is liability, since considerations other than causation, which remain to be discussed,
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only before the District Attorney's filing of the complaint, but after it as
well.
B. Do Common Law Tort Principles Support the Smiddy Holding?
1. The proper application of state and common law in
section 1983 cases.
Although this Note suggests that Smiddy did not provide an ade-
quate rationale for creating a new immunity under section 1983, such a
rationale may exist in common law tort principles of causation. Courts
have generally read section 1983 against the background of common
law tort concepts. 129 One commentator has stated that the federal
courts have looked to three areas of state tort law to define section 1983
actions: (1) state secondary rules, i.e., those governing limitations, sur-
vival and immunities; (2) state tort principles to define the elements
necessary to a plaintiffs section 1983 action; and (3) state tort law to
define the scope of constitutional interest in cases arising under the due
process clause.
130
Courts have generally adopted state law principles for two reasons.
First, Congress has specifically provided in 42 United States Code sec-
tion 1988,131 "that a court hearing a Civil Rights claim shall apply the
may prevent it. It should be quite obvious that, once events are set in motion, there
is, in terms of causation alone, no place to stop.
PROSSER, supra note 100, at 239.
129. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See supra note 3 and accompanying text, In
Monroe Justice Douglas stated: "Section 1979 [now 1983] should be read against the
backgound of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
actions." Id at 187. But see NAHMOD supra note 7. Professor Nahmod suggests that courts
should go beyond tort law in applying § 1983 and look to the federal policies behind § 1983
for guidance. He blames this "narrow vision" in part on Douglas' dicta in Monroe, stating:
Unfortunately, many 1983 cases applied tort law as if with blinders respecting fed-
eral policies involved, seemingly making tort law determinative of 1983 liability. It
is clearly unfair to blame Justice Douglas' dictum for this, but it is apparent courts
have seized upon the 'background of tort liability' catch phrase with little consider-
ation given to the background of 1983 liability.
NAHMOD, supra note 7, at 12-13. Cf. Monroe, 363 U.S. at 191-202 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Harlan suggested that Congress may have thought "a deprivation of a constitutional right is
significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore
deserves a different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and
the deprivation of a constitutional right." 365 U.S. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring).
130. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 15 (1980) (hereinafter Constitu-
tional Torts). However, Professor Whitman also suggests that constitutional tort actions are
not coextensive with actions under state tort law. Id at 14. She notes that in defining a
constitutional tort it is often necessary to draw upon a body of general law, rather than the
law of a particular state. Id
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1980) provides in part:
The jurisdiction in civil. . . matters conferred on the district courts by the provi-
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law of the state in which that court sits when federal law is 'defi-
cient.' ,132 More frequently, courts have used section 1988 to sanction
the application of state tort law for secondary rules, specifically, those
governing limitations, survival and immunities, which are absent from
section 1983.133 Courts have, however, looked to general common law
principles in addition to the law of a particular state for such secondary
rules. 1
34
In defining the elements 35 of a plaintiff's section 1983 claim,
courts have rarely relied exclusively on section 1988.136 Courts have
also looked to general concepts regarding personal obligations devel-
oped over the past century in common law actions for damages.'
37
sions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," . . for the protection of all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object, or are defcient in thepro visions necessary to furnish suita-
ble remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modffed and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court havingjurisdic-
tion of such civil. . . cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the
said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1980) (emphasis added).
132. Constitutional Torts, supra note 130, at 15. According to Professor )Whitman, the
meaning of "deficient" is unclear. Id (citing Eisenberg, State Law and Federal Civil Rights
Cases: The Proper Scope ofsection 1988, 128 U. PA. L. Rav., 449, 508-15 (1980) [hereinafter
Eisenberg]). Eisenberg contends that § 1988 was not intended to apply in § 1983 actions.
Eisenberg's premise is that § 1988 can be logically interpreted only if it is applied solely to
actions that are removed from state to federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1976), the civil
rights removal provision. Eisenberg, supra at 500, 525-32.
133. Notwithstanding Eisenberg's contention, see supra note 132, federal courts, relying
on § 1988, have generally followed the state statute of limitations and survival rule of the
states in which they sit. Constitutional Torts, supra note 130, at 16; see also Board of Regents
v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 492 (1980) (applied state tolling rules); Robertson v. Wedgmann,
436 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978) (applied state survival rules); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318,
323-25 (1914) (applied state statute of limitations); Almon v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203 (4th
Cir. 1972) (applied state statute of limitations); Rondelli v. County of Pima, 120 Ariz. App.
483, 586 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1978) (applied state statute of limitations).
134. Constitutional Torts, supra note 130, at 16. In the cases defining immunities available
to § 1983 defendants, see supra notes 39-67 and accompanying text, the courts invoked prin-
ciples from general common law to arrive at their holdings. Thus, in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 542 (1967), supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text, the Court justified its extension
of common law defenses of good faith and probable cause to police officers sued under
§ 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional arrest by referring to general common law sources,
including RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 100, HARPER & JAMES, supra note 100,
PROSSER, supra note 100; and Constitutional Torts, supra note 130, at 16.
135. These elements include causation, compensable injury, and the requisite state of
mind of the defendant. Constitutional Torts, supra note 130, at 18.
136. Constitutional Torts, supra note 130, at 18. Whitman suggests that the use of com-
mon law seems to occur because § 1983 is unclear about the basis of liability that it imposes.
137. Id Professor Whitman states: "Thus, it is not surprising that judges who are re-
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This reliance on a general body of common law has occurred because
section 1983 is vague about the basis of liability that it imposes. The
Act merely creates a cause of action for damages; it does not create any
substantive rights. 138 However, this void in the Act assumes there is
some way of deciding if an individual is responsible for the deprivation
of constitutional rights.139 In another context, Justice Harlan supported
use of common law concepts to define the elements of section 1983
cases "in framing principles 'concerning causation and magnitude of
injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation.' "140
By discussing the tort principles of proximate cause as applied to
the Smiddy facts, the distinction between a general body of common
law and specific state law becomes significant. Although California
law on proximate cause in false arrest actions still appears to be con-
trary to Smiddy, '4 1 a recent California case, Jackson v. City of San Di-
ego, 142 suggests a trend toward limiting law enforcement agents'
liability to the period before indictment or arraignment. The Jackson
court reasoned that the concept of proximate cause involved policy
considerations and looked to section 117(c) of the California Tort
Claims Act14 for guidance. It noted that the legislature's grant of ab-
quired to define this responsibility fall back on the concepts of personal obligations devolved
over the centuries in common law actions for damages."
138. Id; see e.g. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
139. Constitutional Torts, supra note 130, at 18.
140. Id at 19 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
141. Gill v. Epstein, 62 Cal. 2d 611, 401 P.2d 397, 484 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1965). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court created a rule of law contrary to the presumption created in Smiddy
stating:
Although a chain of causation may be broken by an independent intervening act
which is not reasonably foreseeable . . . plaintiff's arraignment was not such an
act. It was clearly a foreseeable result of the arrest and was actually contemplated
by defendants.
Under the circumstances, the arrest was a proximate cause of plaintiff's im-
prisonment both before and after the arraignment and he is entitled to recover
damages for physical and mental suffering during the entire period he was
confined.
Id at 617-18, 401 P.2d at 401, 484 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49 (citations omitted).
The rule announced in Gill appears to be the controlling law in California. Since the
facts of Smiddy are identical to those in Gill, under California law, Smiddy would be able to
recover for the entire term of his imprisonment both before and after process began. But see
Jackson v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. App. 3d 579, 175 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1981); see infra note
144.
142. 121 Cal. App. 3d 579, 175 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1981); see supra note 116 and accompany-
ing text.
143. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 821.6 (West 1980) provides: A public employee is not liable for
injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding
within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.
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solute immunity in malicious prosecution actions indicated an intent to
expand immunities for law enforcement agents in the interest of pro-
tecting the public. 144 Whether the policies announced in Jackson are to
be given force in section 1983 actions depends upon whether federal
courts are limited to looking to state law to fill the substantive gaps in
section 1983. The United States Supreme Court addressed this precise
issue in Martinez v. California. 145
In Martinez, the survivors of a fifteen year old girl murdered by a
recently released parolee brought an action under section 1983, claim-
ing that the State Parole Board's action in releasing the parolee de-
prived the decedent of life without due process. The Supreme Court
144. Jackson v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. App. 3d 579, 175 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1981). In
Jackson, the plaintiff had been arrested without a warrant by a city police officer for murder
and robbery. Fifteen days later the grand jury returned an indictment against him and he
was rearrested on a bench warrant pursuant to the indictment. He was convicted of robbery
and murder and spent ten months in custody. Plaintiff was released from prison after an-
other man was tried and convicted for the same murder. Upon his release from prison,
plaintiff sued the City of San Diego for false imprisonment. A jury awarded him $280,000
damages.
On appeal, the court chose to look to the California legislature for guidance. It noted
that in enacting the California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810 etseq. (West 1980),
the legislature recognized the difference between the torts of malicious prosecution and false
arrest and enacted distinct provisions for each tort. The Act provided immunity from mali-
cious prosecution, but did not provide such an immunity for the torts of false arrest and false
imprisonment. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.4 (West 1980), provides: "A public employee is not
liable for his act or omission, exercising due care, in the execution or enforcement of any
law. Nothing in this section exonerates apublic employeefrom liabilityforfalse arrest orfalse
imprisonment." (emphasis added). The court reasoned that had the petitioner's restraint
started after his indictment, i.e. lawful process, he would be unable to recover since his action
would be one for malicious prosecution not false imprisonment.
The court held that the Act limited the damages which could be awarded for false
imprisonment to the period of incarceration beginning with the false arrest and ending when
lawful process was initiated. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to the damages he suffered
during the period from his warrantless arrest to the date he was rearrested pursuant to the
grand jury indictment, fifteen days. Thejudgment was reversed and the case was remanded
for retrial on the issue of damages only.
It is important to note that Jackson based its decision completely on the intent of the
California Legislature. It carefully analyzed this intent, citing to debates and articles. See A
Study Relating to Soverign Immuniy, No. I -- Tort Liability of Public Entities and Pub. Em-
ployees, 4 CAL. LAW. REv. COM. REP. 817 (1963). Based on legislative intent the court
announced a policy of cutting off liability after a certain point.
The plaintiff in Smiddy invoked § 1983, a federal statute. Even if the Jackson approach
is adopted by the California Supreme Court and California courts begin to expand official
immunity to cases analagous to Smiddy under the California Tort Claims Act, the
supremacy clause of the Constitution would preclude a strict reliance on the policies an-
nounced in Jackson. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. The Smiddy court,
however, could have similarly analyzed § 1983 in an effort to establish policies relating to
official liability.
145. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
held that the girl's death was too remote a consequence of the parole
officer's action to hold the parole officer liable.'4 6 In so holding the
Supreme Court did not have to decide whether a California immunity
statute applied.147 The Court announced in dicta, however, that the
California immunity statute did not apply even though the federal ac-
tion (section 1983) was originally asserted in the state court. The Court
reasoned that the supremacy clause of the Constitution 4 ' precludes a
state immunity defense to control the effect of a federal statute. The
Court noted that such a construction "would transmute a basic guaran-
tee into an illusory promise."1 49 The foregoing discussion indicates
that the general body of common law tort concepts should apply in
resolving issues of proximate causation in section 1983 actions.
2. Proximate cause in section 1983 actions
In Martinez the United States Supreme Court established that a
plaintifFs section 1983 action must fail if the injury alleged is "too re-
mote a consequence" of the challenged government action.' 50 Thus,
the plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct proximately caused
his or her injury. Although the Smiddy court framed its holding in
terms of chain of causation, it failed to discuss underlying principles of
tort law. Under general principles of tort law, once the plaintiff has
established that defendant's conduct has in fact been one of the causes
of the plaintiff's injury (a "but for" cause), the question of whether the
defendant should be legally responsible for what he or she has caused
must still be resolved. Thus, the question of whether the defendant's
conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's injury remains to be
resolved.' 5'
In Smiddy, the police officer's conduct unquestionably "caused"
the plaintiff's injury. The court recognized that the police officers were
146. Id at 285.
147. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.8 (West 1980) provides in pertinent part:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for:
(a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a pris-
oner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from
determining whether to revoke his parole or release.
148. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
149. 444 U.S. at 284 n.8 (citing Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); McLaughlin v. Tilandis, 398 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir.
1968) (immunity claim raises question of federal law)).
150. 444 U.S. at 285. See supra note 146 and accompanying text; see supra note 30 for
other cases involving proximate cause as applied to § 1983 actions.
151. PROSSER, supra note 100, at 244.
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a "but for"1" 2 cause of the injuries by upholding the damage award for
the time that Smiddy spent in jail before the district attorney filed a
complaint. The court, however, concluded that the police officer's con-
duct was not the proximate cause of damages suffered subsequent to
the filing of criminal charges. In holding that the filing of criminal
charges broke the chain of causation, the Smiddy court appears to have
made a determination that the prosecutor's action was a "superseding
intervening cause" which shielded the defendant from liability for sub-
sequent damage suffered by the plaintiff.153
According to an accepted definition of superseding cause, two ba-
sic elements must be present to find that an intervening action is a su-
perseding cause which cuts off the liability of the original actor: (1) the
intervening action must be independent154 of the original actor's
wrongful conduct, and (2) it must be an unforeseeable1 55 consequence
of the original actor's conduct. In determining the issue of causation in
section 1983 actions, the Ninth Circuit adopted a similar test of reason-
able foreseeability in Johnson v. DUffy.
15 6
Anyone who "causes" any citizen to be subjected to a consti-
152. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
153. See PROSSER, supra note 100, at 270-71; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 100,
at 440. The Smidd court states: "Where the plaintiff has introduced evidence to rebut the
presumption, the burden remains on the defendant to prove that an independent intervening
cause cuts off his tort liability." 665 F.2d at 267 (citing FED. RULE EVID. 301) (emphasis
added). RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 100, at § 440 defines superseding cause as fol-
lows: "A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its interven-
tion prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent
negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about."
The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS lists the following considerations as important in a deter-
mination of whether an intervening force is a superseding cause of harm to another
(a) The fact that its intervention brings about harm is different in kind from that
which would otherwise have resulted in the actor's negligence; (b) the fact that its
operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary
rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its opera-
tions; (c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situa-
tion created by the actor's negligence or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal
result of such a situation; (d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is
due to a third person's act or to his failure to act; (e) the fact that the intervening
force is due to the act of the third person which is wrongful toward the other and as
such subjects the third person to liability to him; (f) the degree of culpability of a
wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening force in motion.
Prosser states that "the questions are always one of whether [the defendant] is to be
relieved of responsibility and his liability superseded, by the subsequent event." PROSSER,
supra note 100, at 173.
154. See PROSSER, supra note 100, at 173.
155. See id at 84.
156. 588 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1978); see supra note 30 for other § 1983 proximate cause
cases; see also text accompanying notes 118-20 for general discussion of proximate causa-
tion in § 1983 actions.
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tutional deprivation is also liable. The requisite causal con-
nection can be established not only by some kind of direct
personal participation in the deprivation, but also by selling in
motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or rea-
sonably should know would cause others to inflict the consti-
tutional injury.
57
Applying this proximate cause analysis to the facts of Smiddy, it is
apparent that the Smiddy court's determination that the filing of a com-
plaint is a superseding cause of the injuries endured thereafter suffers
from two analytical flaws. First, a recent study of criminal procedure
practice in this country"'8 indicates that with respect to prosecutorial-
police relations, the prosecutorial decision to charge, rather than being
presumptively independent is actually so intertwined with the actions
of police officers as to render the interrelationship inseverable.1 59 The
police officers investigate, prepare and present a case for fling.
160
While in theory, the prosecutor has tremendous discretion in screening
cases and deciding whether to file charges,' 6 1 the study reveals that in
51% of the offices in the jurisdictions studied, the police control the
initial charging decision.'
62
The facts of Smiddy indicate that the police presented the prosecu-
tor with a case file. If the police had been negligent in pursuing their
investigation, as they appear to have been in Smiddy, the prosecutor
157. 588 F.2d at 743 (emphasis added).
158. See generally Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge A Suspect vith A Crime;
Police-Prosecutor Relations in the United States: Executive Summary, (1981) (Institute of
Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter Police-Pros-
ecutor Relations]; KAMISAR, LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (5th ed.
1980).
159. See generally PROSSER, surpa note 100, at 316-20 for discussion of apportionment of
damages among joint tortfeasors. But see Jackson v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. App. 3d
579, 588-89, 175 Cal. Rptr. 395, 400-01 (1981) which suggests that in situations such as
Smiddy, it is possible to apportion damages, holding police responsible for injuries suffered
before process and the D.A. responsible for damages suffered thereafter. Id Because the
D.A. enjoys absolute immunity, liability would exist only for damages incurred prior to
process.
160. See generally Police-Prosecutor Relations, supra note 158, at 28-32. A recent study of
the relationship between police and prosecutors in jurisdictions with populations over
100,000 conducted by the Georgetown University of Criminal Law and Practice provides
compelling insight into the intermeshing of the two law enforcement bodies with regard to
the charging decision.
161. See generally id
162. Id at 43. For example, in one area of the country "very little pre-charging screening
is done and only a small number of arrestees are released without charges being filed."
KAMISAR, LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, supra note 158, at 176. But see Police-Prosecutor Relations,
supra note 158, at 47. The study indicates that a trend toward more prosecutorial indepen-
dence is gradually developing throughout the country.
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had no way of knowing that the police information was incomplete or
inaccurate. Thus, the prosecutor's decision to charge in this type of
situation "depends" on erroneous police information.
The second flaw in the Smiddy court's determination of supersed-
ing cause was the court's failure to discuss the foreseeability element.
While not all arrests lead to prosecution, it is reasonably foreseeable
that prosecution might result from an arrest. It is unlikely that in ar-
resting an individual the police do not foresee, and actually hope, that
the prosecutor will file charges. Defendant Varney testified revealingly
that "after Smiddy's arrest, he and defendant Knuckles [sic] had only
48 hours to 'put a case together' and bring it to the prosecutor for
filing." 16 3
In deciding Smiddy the Ninth Circuit not only departed from a
traditional common law approach to proximate cause, but also from its
own section 1983 proximate cause test announced in Johnson v.
Duffy. 164 In Smiddy, as in Dufy, the police caused the plaintiff "to be
subjected to a constitutional deprivation. . .[and to set] in motion a
series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should
know would cause others [the D.A.] to inflict the constitutional in-
jury." 165 Because all of the Duffy requirements appear to be satisfied
under the facts of Smiddy, it is unclear on what basis the Smiddy court
arrived at its conclusion.
V. CONCLUSION
By virtually creating a new immunity for law enforcement agents
under section 1983, the Ninth Circuit ignored applicable United States
Supreme Court precedent and failed to give adequate weight to the
policies behind section 1983. These policies militate against the crea-
tion of such an immunity. In addition the Smiddy court did not point
to a single authority that directly supported its holding, thereby render-
ing its novel theory of immunity vulnerable to attack.
Moreover, the court's reliance on a proximate causation analysis is
flawed. Admittedly, there may be times when the police conduct is not
the proximate cause of incarceration after process. For example, if, af-
ter an arrest, police realize that probable cause is deficient and so in-
form the prosecutor, then the decision to charge would be a
superseding cause which should cut off police liability. In almost every
163. Appellant's Brief supra, note 12 at 17.
164. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
165. 588 F.2d at 743-44.
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other situation, however, under a traditional tort foreseeability ap-
proach, the police are the force that sets the chain of events in motion,
and they should be liable for the natural consequences of the arrest.
That would include at least damages resulting during the period of in-
carceration after the charging decision.
At a time when the public is demanding law and order - and the
courts are questioning the exclusionary rule and narrowing its scope,
section 1983 becomes more important as an alternative means of deter-
ring unlawful police activity and providing a remedy for plaintiffs who
have suffered from such unlawful activity. Although an imperfect alter-
native,166 section 1983 provides a method of deterrence that should sat-
isfy law and order proponents. Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle
with which to "exonerate the guilty," by overturning trials or excluding
crucial bits of evidence because of "technicalities" caused by unlawful
police activity. Rather, section 1983 enables innocent victims of unlaw-
ful police conduct who have already been exonerated to redress the vio-
lations of their constitutional rights. By expanding police immunity,
the Smiddy court diluted the utility of section 1983. In view of its de-
parture from Supreme Court authority, Smiddy's precedential value
should be seriously questioned.
Myrna K Greenberg
166. Section 1983 actions are costly and time consuming and thus for the average citizen
such actions are often impractical if not impossible to pursue. See supra note 7.
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